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I. INTRODUCTION
We live in an age of ecology.2 Environmentalism and its parent science ecology
"ha[ve] become part of the mainstream human ethos."3 In this "age of ecological
awareness" 4 we are reevaluating, transforming, and refining the human relationship
with the environment.5 We realize that "It]he human animal is a part of the
ecosystem, not merely an aloof observer." 6 Consequently, traditional notions of
property law must contend with new scientific discoveries about our environment
as well as popular notions of an environmental ethic.
The science of ecology is the predominant force in shaping and defining how
we see ourselves in relation to our environment. Ecology is the branch of science
concerned with the patterns and relationships between organisms and their
environment.7 Ecology is a broad discipline,8 which can colorfully be described as
the study of the human "life support system." 9 Aldo Leopold provides a conceptual
2. See In re Flying W Airways, Inc., 341 F. Supp. 26, 33 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (declaring that the age of ecology
"dawned in the late 1960's and has now spread across the land"); see also Robert J. Goldstein, Green Wood in the
Bundle of Sticks: Fitting Environmental Ethics and Ecology into Real Property Law, 25 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV.
347, 386-87 (1998) (adding this "trend that has blossomed since the early 1960s" due, in part, to "a rich literary
heritage underscored by such prescient thinkers as Henry David Thoreau, Aldo Leopold, and Rachel Carson;...
the growth of the science of ... ecology"; and "the horrifying legacy of two centuries of mindless exploitation of
the natural environment"); Eric T. Freyfogle, The Owning and Taking of Sensitive Lands, 43 UCLA L. REv. 77, 138
(1995) (stating recent decisions in wetlands cases "offer a sense of forward motion, a sense that ownership norms
are inexorably moving beyond the industrial age into the ecological one").
3. John C. Tucker, Constitutional Codification of an Environmental Ethic, 52 FLA. L. REv. 299,325 (2000);
see Joseph L. Sax, Property Rights and the Economy of Nature: Understanding Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1433, 1446 (1993) (explaining that "the economy of nature is emerging as a prominent
viewpoint" in the American culture); see also Goldstein, supra note 2, at 408 (stating"[e]nvironmental ethics have
become part of our societal ethos").
4. Sax, supra note 3, at 1455.
5. See Tucker, supra note 3, at 302 (stating "societies throughout the world are elevating environmental
protection to constitutional status"); see also id at 307-15 (examining various state and international (Brazilian and
Polish) constitutional provisions dealing with the environment); id. at 306, 327 (concluding that "the integration
of the environment into state constitutions, national constitutions, and international law is powerful evidence of a
societal environmental ethic" and "reflects the maturation of [an] environmental consciousness and concern [for
the maintenance of a healthy environment] as a legitimate social value").
6. Goldstein, supra note 2, at 391.
7. THE NEW MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY 241 (10th ed. 1989).
8. See Goldstein, supra note 2, at 402.
"Ecology is the study of the structure and function of nature. Structure includes the
distribution and abundance of organisms as influenced by the biotic and abiotic elements of
the environment; and function includes how populations grow and interact, including
competition, predation, parasitism, mutualisms, and transfers of nutrients and energy."
Id. (quoting ROBERT LEE SMITH, ECOLOGY AND FIELD BIOLOGY 3 (4th ed. 1990)).
9. Goldstein, supra note 2, at 401-02.
"Life-support environment is that part of the earth that provides the physiological necessities
of life, namely, food and other energy, mineral nutrients, air, and water.... [L]ife-support
system [i]s the functional term for the environment, organisms, processes, and resources
interacting to provide these physical necessities. By processes we mean operations such as
food production, water recycling, waste assimilation, air purification, and so on. Some of
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model of the ecosystem in the "Land Pyramid." Leopold noted that "the balance of
nature" can best be described as a pyramid: a base level consisting of soil which
supports plant life, which supports insect life and so on through the layers of species
with man occupying an intermediate level with bears, raccoons, and squirrels.10
Although upward progression through successive layers of the pyramid necessarily
means a decrease in the numerical abundance of species, species in every layer are
connected through the "lines of dependency for food and other services" known as
"food chains."'" Basically, "ecology tells us ... that all forms of life are linked
with, and dependent upon, all other forms of life, and ultimately with the land
itself."' 2 The biotic units that make up the environment-called ecosystems-are the
focus of ecology.' 3 An ecosystem is defined as "'a community of organisms
interacting with one another and with the chemical and physical factors making up
their environment."" 14 Encompassing both biotic and abiotic factors, 5 ecosystems
are the basic unit of our existence, and link one estate of land to another estate of
land. 16 Today, ecosystem management is touted as the preferred way to manage land
in the face of today's natural resource controversies.17
Ecology "is no longer an esoteric branch of biology concerned only with the
mutual relationships between environment and plants and feral animal organisms."' 8
Rather, ecology is a science whose tenants have "acquired a specific sociological
significance."'' 9 Just as ecology has assumed a prominent role in modern American
these processes are organized and controlled by humans, but many are natural and driven by
solar or other natural energies. All life-support processes involve the activities of organisms
other than humans-plants, animals, and microbes."
Id. (quoting EUGENE P. ODUM, ECOLOGY AND OUR ENDANGERED LIFE-SUPPORT SYSTEMS 13 (2d ed 1989).
10. ALDO LEOPOLD, A SAND COUNTY ALMANAC 214-15 (1949).
11. Id. at 215.
12. Freyfogle, supra note 2, at 78; see id. (explaining that in order to understand nature's order, we must not
look at individual objects in isolation, but must appreciate that the world "is a maze of interconnection and
interdependence, an organic whole laced together by nutrients and energy flowing through primary producers to
top carnivores, and then back to the soil to nourish new life").
13. Goldstein, supra note 2, at 351; see id. (defining an ecosystem as the basic ."energy-processing and
nutrient-regenerating system whose components have evolved over a long period of time"') (quoting EUGENE P.
ODUM, ECOLOGY AND OUR ENDANGERED LIFE-SuPPORT SYSTEMS 13 (2d ed 1989).
14. Robert B. Keiter, Beyond the Boundary Line: Constructing a Low of Ecosystem Management, 65 U.
COLO. L. REV. 239, 301 (1994) (quoting G. TYLER MILLER, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCE: SUSTAINING THE EARTH
A7 (1991)).
15. Id.
16. Goldstein, supra note 2, at 351.
17. See Keiter, supra note 14, at 294-95 (explaining that ecosystem management is the management of
ecosystems as a holistic, integrated entity, focusing on the system as a whole and not on individual resources, in
order to restore and sustain natural processes); id. at 295, 298 (recognizing that natural systems are not confined
to jurisdictional boundaries, and so, "to ensure a sustainable resource base for future generations" ecosystem
management is "based upon often-changing, ecologically-defined boundaries"); see id. at 295, 333 (stating that
ecosystem management "has now been defined with sufficient precision to constitute a viable natural resource
management policy" and "is now taking hold on the public domain").
18. People v. K. Sakai Co., 56 Cal. App. 3d 531, 535 (1st Dist. 1976).
19. People v. K. Sakai Co., 56 Cal. App. 3d 531, 535 (1st Dist. 1976).
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thought, ecology also applies to the law; it is real property science.2° Currently, the
science of ecology shapes and defines our notions of the environment 2 and should
be the basis for our new environmental ethic.
However, humans have not always been so concerned with the environment or
the environmental consequences of their actions. "History demonstrates a lack of
regard for nature. 22 This is especially true when one considers the rampant and
unrestrained development of the "dense and uninhabited wilderness ' '23 in the
nineteenth century.24 American Pioneers, endorsed by the nineteenth-century
judiciary, set out to develop the wilderness-to tame "the haunt of savages and
beasts of prey. '25 After all, "[w]hat are the esplees of a wilderness under the
dominion of the tomahawk and the scalping knife? '26 "Man-as-conqueror"
accurately reflects the nineteenth-century paradigm concerning humans and how
they viewed their relationship with the natural world.
But today, equipped with our new understandings of ecology, the "present...
shift in focus from conquering the land to preservation, 27 has resulted in the
emergence of "[a] new land ethic, an ethic of planning and stability., 28 The age old
conception of "man-as-conqueror"2 9 of the natural world is slowly evolving into a
holistic notion of "landowner-as-steward" of his natural environment.3 °
However, outmoded notions of property law prevent a harmonization of ecology
and law. If judges continue applying property doctrines developed in the nineteenth
century, which promote wilderness destruction, principles of ecology will never
have their day in court. Consistent with our new understanding of the environment,
courts should adjust modern property law to include a condition of stewardship
within the common law notions of what it means to be a property owner in the
twenty-first century. By emphasizing the dual roles property plays in our society and
20. See Goldstein, supra note 2, at 406-07 (stating that "[e]cology is the science that identifies the systems
which run the earth, and that establishes scientifically plausible connections between the action of real property
owners/users and the results of those actions on that real property and so on other ecosystems").
21. Goldstein, supra note 2, at 390-91.
22. Goldstein, supra note 2, at 388.
23. Oliver v. Piatt, 44 U.S. 333, 382 (1845).
24. See infra Part II.A (describing the early settlement and development of America as often destructive for
the environment).
25. Green v. Liter, 12 U.S. 229, 248 (1814).
26. id. at 237.
27. Mark W. Cordes, Property Rights and Land Use Controls: Balancing Private and Public Interest, 19
N. ILL. U. L. REV. 629,643 (1999).
28. John A. Humbach, Law and a New Land Ethic, 74 MINN. L. REV. 339, 341 (1989).
29. The phrase "man-as-conqueror" is a paradigm taken from Aldo Leopold's famous book, A Sand County
Almanac. See LEOPOLD, supra note 10, at 223 (describing the historic need for man to tame the wilderness, and
develop the natural world into what man deems is an "acceptable" place to live).
30. See Goldstein, supra note 2, at 347 (stating that there is an "increasing awareness of the need for human
stewardship of the environment"); see also Cordes, supra note 27, at 644 (asserting that our perspectives on land
use have changed for two reasons: (1) we realize the increasing scarcity of essential natural resources like land, air,
and water, and (2) we have come to understand and appreciate the valuable ecological role of land, especially that
land in its natural state can also serve society).
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labeling environmental damage as a cognizable harm capable of redress under the
law of nuisance, such adjustments within the law may be accomplished.
This comment examines how the doctrine of nuisance can be a tool to protect
environmental values while respecting the sanctity of private property rights. Part
II gives a historical perspective on land use in the United States which gave rise to
the "man-as-conqueror" paradigm3' and argues that present day sentiment between
people and their environment requires a shift to the "landowner-as-steward"
paradigm.3 2 Part III examines the dual nature of property, analyzing the public and
private aspects of property, and argues that it is a proper place for the courts to be
receptive to popular environmental sentiment and involve themselves in establishing
the "landowner-as-steward" ideal.33 Part IV proposes a judicial course of action by
defining a workable environmental ethic, through the vehicle of nuisance law, and
demonstrating that nuisance law is an effective tool in protecting environmental
values while being cognizant of private property rights.34 Part V concludes that
environmental protection is a necessary course of action, that it is supported by an
ever-growing segment of the population, and that it can be accomplished, in part,
through the broadened nuisance principles as may be applied by the courts.
35
II. A PROGRESSION OF PARADIGMS
A. The Evolution of the "Man-as-Conqueror" Paradigm in American Society
and the Law
Modem property law does not instill a land ethic necessary to encourage the
landowner-as-steward ideal.36 In many instances environmental consequences of
activities are not even taken into account by courts precisely because they are not
31. See infra Part I.A (explaining how the "man-as-conquer" paradigm developed and manifested itself in
early America).
32. See infra Part II.B (arguing that our increased knowledge of ecology and understanding of our natural
world necessitates a paradigm shift from the "conqueror" paradigm to "landowner-as-steward" paradigm).
33. See infra Part III (noting that property serves both private and public interests; that there are limits and
constraints on the use of property, and that it is appropriate for courts, in protecting environmental values, to rely
on and emphasize these attributes of property).
34. See infra Part IV (arguing that the science of ecology may serve as the basis for developing a workable
standard, which the judiciary can use to develop an environmental ethic); see also infra Part IV (arguing that
specifically broadening our concepts of "reasonableness" and "harm" to include destructive and detrimental
environmental injury enables the judiciary to utilize the doctrine of nuisance to help curb environmental
degradation).
35. See infra Part V (concluding that environmental protection is a necessary course of action and can be
accomplished, in part, by a judiciary that applies these broadened concepts of nuisance).
36. See Goldstein, supra note 2, at 403 (stating that there is a "failure of current environmental laws to
further the environmental ethic"); see also Jerry L. Anderson, Takings and Expectations: Toward a "Broader
Vision" of Property Rights, 37 U. KAN. L. REv. 529, 534-35 (1989) (explaining that "[t]wo hundred years of
constitutional law in this country have failed to produce a consensus on the rights of the individual vis-a-vis society
with respect to property").
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considered as a cognizable harm by judges.37 Today, it is widely recognized that
American property law, as it has been developed by nineteenth-century judges, has
a pervasive "antiwilderness bias., 38 That American property laws have developed
such a wilderness disdain is hardly surprising, given the historical time frame in
which property laws were developed.39
"Early Americans viewed the seemingly endless wilderness with repugnance" n°
and put their efforts into conquering their wild adversary."a American settlers saw
the vast, wild, untamed land as an obstacle to progress and an unwanted impediment
to prosperity and national expansion.42 Early settlers and pioneers accepted without
question the prevailing notions of the day that property rights automatically included
the right to unrestrained development of land as well as the right to reap the profits
of the land-profits without regard for the toll their actions took on the
environment.
43
The "frontier ethic," under which early settlers adhered to, demanded supremacy
over the land.44 From the earliest days of European settlement this seemingly
boundless wilderness tantalized the entrepreneurial settler a.4  To early Americans,
precious natural resources appeared inexhaustible. In fact, the "vastness and
plentitude [of] the continent encouraged a consumptive, aggrandizing culture, a
culture that used and discarded, one that soon became restless with what it possessed
and looked always for the next acre to clear., 46 As if on a moral crusade against the
37. See Freyfogle, supra note 2, at 126 (explaining that "[blecause environmental harms are often so much
more subtle, indirect, and diffused than the harms that the common law has normally considered, courts may be
prone, wrongly, to discount or ignore them").
38. See generally John G. Sprankling, The Antiwilderness Bias in American Property Law, 63 U. CHI. L.
REV. 519 (1996) (arguing that, with an abundance of wilderness, American judges developed various doctrines,
including waste, adverse possession, possession as notice to a bona fide purchaser, good faith improver, trespass,
and nuisance, to encourage agrarian development of land, effectively promoting the destruction of privately owned
American wilderness).
39. See Donald W. Large, This Land is Whose Land? Changing Concepts of Land as Property, 1973 Wis.
L. REV. 1039, 1082 (1973) (explaining that "[ojur property concepts were developed in a time when exploitation
of the land's bounty was seen as a social good to be encouraged").
40. Sprankling, supra note 38, at 530-31. Early pioneers "attacked the wilderness relentlessly, destroying
forests with girdling and fire." Id.
4 1. See LEOPOLD, supra note 10, at 188 (explaining that "[t]o the laborer in the sweat of his labor, the raw
stuff on his anvil is an adversary to be conquered. So was wilderness an adversary to the pioneer.").
42. Sprankling, supra note 38, at 531.
43. See Large, supra note 39, at 1044 (stating that this early concept of property as a means to profit included
the notion that it was acceptable "to change the very essence of the land, if necessary to obtain that profit").
44. Freyfogle, supra note 2, at 95; see Large, supra note 39, at 1043 (explaining that early settlers were
driven by "an anthropocentric religion which demanded that man exercise dominion over the earth and all the lesser
creatures").
45. See Freyfogle, supra note 2, at 95 (stating that the "seemingly vacant and plentiful country beckoned
the restless American immigrant").
46. Id. at 96; see Cordes, supra note 27, at 643 (explaining that, as a young country, America needed growth
and economic expansion which tended to convert property into intensive land uses and reasoning that since land
was only seen to have value when developed, and since raw land was plentiful, consumptive and destructive use
of land was not threatening).
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wilderness, early settlers cleared and domesticated their environment. Far from an
end in itself, wilderness provided early settlers with merely the "raw material, not
the finished product."48 Hence, the wilderness was a means to making human
aspirations come true. 9
The American judiciary shared, and encouraged, the antiwilderness sentiment
of the people.5° As Professor Freyfogle explains, American property law developed
an extreme human-centered approach in the nineteenth century, to the exclusion of
any prowilderness values:
As much as any body of law, property law evolved in response to the felt
needs of the American people. By the early nineteenth century, it had
finally become clear that the ultimate source of law was the people and their
will; the law had become an expression of shared values, and a potent
instrument of popular change. People were not just the source of law; they
were, importantly, the law's only recognized subjects-the beings for
whose benefit the law existed."
Nineteenth-century courts often worded their opinions to express this prejudice
against wilderness. 52 "I confess," candidly wrote Justice Marshall, "that I have no
difficulty in pronouncing against the existence of unsettled and uncultivated
lands. ' 53 The "dreary, uninhabited wilderness" 54 was seen by the nineteenth-century
judiciary as "mere uncultivated country, [with] wild and impenetrable woods.., the
sullen and solitary haunts of beasts of prey., 55 To make matters worse for early
,,56 "cvrdwtsettlers, these "'wild lands,' uncultivated, [and] of little value, were "covered with
s[a]vages equally fierce and hostile. 57 Nevertheless, to the satisfaction of the court,
the early pioneers pressed on "find[ing their] way through pathless deserts, into
lands still overrun by the aborigines, in order to 'break a twig,' or 'turn a sod.'
58
47. See Freyfogle, supra note 2, at 96 (stating that the "aggressiveness of frontier culture took on moral and
aesthetic overtones" so that unexploited acres "suggested sloth and moral weakness on the owner's part-a hint that
the human owner was not up to the challenges of the land"); id. (explaining also that the "ideal pastoral vision" did
not include ugly sloughs or weed patches).
48. Id. at 96.
49. Id.
50. See Sprankling, supra note 38, at 531 (stating that early nineteenth-century judges shared the people's
anitwilderness prejudice and drafted opinions to promote "the ideology of exploitive utilitarinanism: land in its
natural condition was considered essentially worthless until converted to human use").
51. Freyfogle, supra note 2, at 98-99.
52. Sprankling, supra note 38, at 531.
53. Brown v. Gilman, 17 U.S. 255, 297 (1819).
54. Shoemaker v. Kingsbury, 79 U.S. 369, 374 (1870).
55. Green, 12 U.S. at 249 (1814).
56. Lewis v. Barnhart, 145 U.S. 56, 59 (1892).
57. Massie v. Watts, 10 U.S. 148, 164 (1810). The court never did reconcile or explain how an "uninhabited
wilderness" could be "covered with sevages [sic]." Id.
58. Davis v. Mason, 26 U.S. 503, 507 (1828).
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After all, "[t]o leave them [the Native Americans] in possession of their country,
was to leave the country a wilderness."'5 9
Ultimately the legal profession elevated notions of property to a level of
abstraction,60 which would severely cripple our ability to see ourselves as members
within the dynamic environmental community.6 'As judges and lawyers argued over
the hypothetical Blackacre, "property lost its tethers with any particular spot on the
landscape; it became an imaginary ideal, unrelated to the natural world. 62 The
"bundle of rights" that we describe as characteristic of property ownership added
further to the abstraction of property as something not attached to the physical
world.63
In the nineteenth-century judicial mind, the impetus was clear: develop
"property law doctrines that meet the challenges of a wilderness nation"; develop
the frontier.64  Required to contend with the formidable American
wilderness-dense, vast forests, detestable swamps and wetlands, boundless plains
and prairies, formidable mountain ranges, and inhospitable desert-nineteenth-
century American judges "constructed a new property law system with an inherent
antiwilderness bias": "[T]he reformulated common law of property tended to resolve
use and title disputes in favor of the wilderness exploiter and against the wilderness
nonuser."
65
In The Antiwilderness Bias in American Property Law, Professor Sprankling
explores the issue of whether modern property law influences the destruction of
privately owned wilderness.66 Rejecting the conventional assumption that property
law is essentially neutral, 67 he contends that "For two centuries, the common law of
59. Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. 543, 590 (1823).
60. See Freyfogle, supra note 2, at 97 (explaining the law did not treat property as part of a living community
but as a "disembodied idea" which the property owner could use and control to the exclusion of outsiders).
61. See William B. Stoebuck, Police Power, Takings, and Due Process, 37 WASH& LEE L. REv., 1057, 1086
(1980) (explaining that property rights are "a construct, a thing of the mind and not of the earth"); see also
Goldstein, supra note 2, at 412 (stating "[i]n an effort to raise the theory of property to a universal and highly
intellectual principle, the res was forgotten. The bundle of sticks has no ties to the ground"); id. (concluding "[i]n
the absence of a theoretical connection to the real nature of real property, the treatment of it, without regard to any
environmental implications is inevitable"); id. at 369 (stating that, although American property law "may have
wavered between ... varying philosophical constructs, it seems clear that the prevalent concept is based on the
abstraction of rights and duties").
62. Freyfogle, supta note 2, at 97.
63. See id. at 98 (stating that this abstraction of property led to the narrow view of property as a mechanism
through which one could derive income such that the value of land was directly related to the land's income-
producing capability). For a criticism of the bundle of sticks approach to property, see Goldstein, supra note 2, at
371-74 (pointing out that the concept is flawed in the sense that it describes only rights in property to the exclusion
of responsibilities of landownership).
64. Sprankling, supra note 38, at 525-26.
65. Id. at 526.
66. Id. at 520.
67. See id. at 520 (explaining that the "conventional assumption" is that property law is neutral, "neither
encouraging nor discouraging wilderness destruction, except in the limited sense of facilitating owner autonomy");
see also id. (stating that any wilderness disappearance is a result of land owners "voluntary choice," an exercise of
their free will).
McGeorge Law Review / Vol. 33
property has actively encouraged [the] destruction [of land] through an inherent
antiwilderness bias ..... and concludes that this is a trend that we still see today.
68
Professor Spranklng asserts that English property law, as brought to the
American continent by early settlers, was an inadequate tool to govern the task of
developing wilderness. 69 The English common law of property was not calibrated
to meet the needs of American settlers because of diametric conditions with regard
to land in the different countries. England was a small island nation, fully explored,
portioned out, and developed, and so its laws evolved to reflect the reality that it was
a country which had met its limits and was in a mode of preservation. On the other
hand, America was an immense landmass, with wild, seemingly endless terrain.
Judges needed to develop a body of property law uniquely suited to meet the
demands of the landscape, 7' and "slowly remolded English property law doctrines
to meet the challenges of a wilderness nation., 72 The system they constructed was
premised on a fundamental antiwilderness bias.73
B. A Time for Change: From the "Conqueror" Paradigm to the "Steward"
Paradigm
Today, only ten to twenty percent of this country is "wilderness. 74 For all
practical purposes, Americans have conquered and tamed this land.75 Yet we
continue to use property doctrines similar to those of the nineteenth century. The
reality that we do not live on a boundless continent, coupled with an increasingly
sophisticated understanding of our affects on the natural environment, should cause
us to broaden our notions of property and infuse modem property law with an
environmental ethic.76
68. See id. at 590 (stating that even today, our "property law system typically adjudicates use and title
disputes concerning privately owned wilderness by preferring exploitation to preservation").
69. See id. at 523-24 (explaining that "English property law was a poor tool for encouraging the exploitation
of virgin land").
70. See id. at 524 (noting the "English wilderness had vanished long before the discovery of America" and
so England evolved a "semipreservationist property law system attuned to a postwildemess nation").
71. See id. at 523 (explaining nineteenth-century judges were "faced with the task of fashioning a body of
property law that would encourage national development").
72. Id. at 525.
73. Id. at 526.
74. See id. at 519 (explaining that the area that is now the United States was over 95 percent wilderness at
the beginning of the nineteenth century); see also Humbach, supra note 28, at 340 (adding that the "remnant wild
lands" that remain "lie in isolated bits in the east and in larger fragments father west"); see id. at 340 n.3 (noting
that there is a total of approximately 90 million acres of land in the National Wilderness Preservation System); see
also The Wilderness Act of 1964, 16 U.S.C.A. § 1131(c) (West 1964) (defining wilderness as "an area where the
earth and its community of life are untrammeled by man, where man himself is a visitor who does not remain").
75. See Humbach, supra note 28, at 340 (stating that "[t]he American landscape has been transformed.
Instead of a great wilderness, America's land is now a groomed and cluttered place.").
76. See Anderson, supra note 36, at 551 (explaining that the notion that property owners should not be
allowed to use their property to injure the public interest is more broad than the condition that property should not
be used to injure others).
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Standing elbow to elbow with our neighbors, we are finally forced to re-evaluate
our situation. What we now discover is that two very different worlds are coming
together: "By the late twentieth century, this expansionist, market-oriented, tame-
the-land ethic would collide noisily with a much different orientation toward the
land, one based on the vague but influential sense that humans are part of the land
community and have responsibilities to fellow community members. 77 Today, we
realize, the age of ecology is upon us. In the face of "mounting evidence that we are
pushing the land far too hard, 78 an environmental ethic has surfaced within the
popular culture. 79 Today, society's environmental consciousness has matured to the
point where many people understand that the maintenance and preservation of the
environment is a sound and important goal.8°
Society recognizes the concept that environmental protection is an exceedingly
critical goal; "[land and resources are finite, and we require them for our
survival." 81 Humans need clean air to breath and clean water to drink. For at least
the foreseeable future, we will depend on the land to grow our crops, the oceans to
77. Freyfogle, supra note 2, at 96-97.
78. Id. at 79, 113 (stating that "environmentalists sense strongly today, that humans must contain, if not
reduce, their overall impact on the land" and "pay greater heed to the functioning of natural communities and work
harder to respect that functioning by keeping [our environment in good condition]").
79. See Tucker, supra note 3, at 325 (stating that "[elnvironmentalism, often used in the past to describe a
fringe movement, has become part of the mainstream human ethos").
80. See id. (concluding that the fact that increasing numbers of citizens are understanding the importance
of the environment is due to "an increasingly sophisticated understand[ing] of basic ecological relationships and
scientific principles," as well as an "understanding that economic self-interest often trumps the environment in the
absence of law"). Perhaps the most conclusive and reliable evidence that environmental concerns are legitimately
in the forefront of society's awareness is when one considers the number of environmental law journals being
produced today. The Harvard Blue Book lists twenty-three law journals dedicated to the exploration of current
environmental issues. See THE BLUEBOOK: A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF CITATION 320-341 tbl. T. 10 (COLUMBIA LAW
REVIEW ASS'N ET AL. EDS., 17th ed. 2000) (listing the following: Boston College Environmental Affairs Law
Review; Buffalo Environmental Law Journal; Colorado Journal of International Environmental Law and Policy;
Columbia Journal of Environmental Law; Dickinson Journal of Environmental Law & Policy; Duke Environmental
Law & Policy Forum; Florida State University Journal of Land Use & Environmental Law; Fordham
Environmental Law Journal; Georgetown International Environmental Law Review; Harvard Environmental Law
Review; Hastings West-Northwest Journal of Environmental Law and Policy; Missouri Environmental Law and
Policy Review; New York University Environmental Law Journal; Pace Environmental Law Review; South Carolina
Environmental Law Journal; Stanford Environmental Law Journal; Temple Environmental Law & Technology
Journal; Tulane Environmental Law Journal; UCLA Journal of Environmental Law and Policy; University of
Baltimore Journal of Environmental Law; Villanova Environmental Law Journal; Virginia Environmental Law
Journal; and Wisconsin Environmental Law Journal). In addition to these journals, a number of other periodicals
also explore environmental issues. See id. (listing the following: Ecology Law Quarterly; Environmental Lawyer;
Great Plains Natural Resources Journal; Institute on Planning, Zoning, and Eminent Domain; Journal of Energy;
Natural Resources & Environmental Law; Journal of Environmental Law and Litigation; Journal of International
Wildlife Law and Policy; Journal of Land, Resources, & Environmental Law; Journal of Land Use and
Environmental Law; Journal of Mineral Law & Policy; Land and Water Law Review; Natural Resources Journal;
Ocean and Coastal Law Journal; Public Land Law Review; Public Land and Resources Law Review; RISK: Health,
Safety & Environment; Rocky Mountain Mineral Law Institute; and State Bar of Texas Environmental Law Journal).
81. Joan L. McGregor, Property Rights and Environmental Protection: Is This Land Made for You and Me?
31 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 391, 392 (1999); see id. (stating that "[tihe environment can no longer be seen as a vast unlimited
resource that we can exploit without consequence for our own advantage").
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provide fish, and the earth's forests to regulate our global atmosphere. No matter
how technically advanced we become, the land will always constitute our "source
of life.
82
Aside from satisfying our physical, biological needs, "land as a whole ... is
vitally important to the psychological and physiological well-being of mankind."83
Fishing, climbing, camping, skiing, and hiking are activities best done outdoors. For
some reason, the experience is more satisfying, and Half Dome is more impressive
when one views it standing in a meadow on the valley floor, rather than in your
kitchen looking at a postcard. Perhaps, for the first time in our country's history,
"we are coming to recognize the intrinsic value of the natural world. 84
III. THE COURT'S ROLE
A. Promulgation of Judicial Environmental Ethics
Since the American judiciary played a large role in shaping people's attitudes
and behavior toward nature in ways that encouraged wilderness destruction and
exploitation, it is only fitting that courts today adopt a pro-environment,
conservationist land ethic to reshape people's notions of the duties and
responsibilities inherent in the private property owner.85 In order to successfully
reshape human thought about their relationship and responsibility to the
environment, it is absolutely necessary that courts actively involve themselves in
leading a property renaissance.86 As Aldo Leopold noted, "No important change in
ethics was ever accomplished without an internal change in our intellectual
emphasis, loyalties, affections, and convictions."87 By shaping the way we think and
behave, courts are unquestionably in a unique position to influence our relationship
with the natural world.
A successful transition from the "man-as-conqueror" paradigm of land use to
the "landowner-as-steward" ideal requires the judiciary to distance itself from, if not
completely reject, outdated nineteenth-century notions of property. Retooling public
sentiment about land use and redefining the human relationship within the natural
world will require judges to embrace environmental values and realize that land use
82. Large, supra note 39, at 1040.
83. Id. at 1040; see id. at 1040 n.12 (quoting BROWER, Wilderness, in THE ENVIRONMENTAL HANDBOOK
148-49 (G. DeBell ed., 1970)) (explaining "[w]ildemess is important as an idea... It's a commodity we make use
of even when we aren't in it; its existence makes New York City or Oakland more tolerable, because we know that
there is something else").
84. McGregor, supra note 81, at 392.
85. See Sprankling, supra note 38, at 586 (stating "U]ust as the nineteenth-century instrumentalist [judges]
retooled English property law to meet the challenge of wilderness abundance, modem neoinstrumentalist judges
must transform American property law to contend with the problem of wilderness scarcity").
86. See LEOPOLD, supra note 10, at 200-01 (stating "[i]t is only the scholar who understands why the raw
wilderness gives definition and meaning to the human enterprise").
87. Id. at 209-10.
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should be governed by ecological needs. Once environmental values are embraced
by courts and become central to the resolution of cases, popular sentiment about the
environment may mature into the "landowner-as-steward" ideal.
Although this will require the judiciary to walk a proverbial tight rope,
balancing the sanctity and importance of private property rights on the one hand,
and public goals of the environment on the other, judges already have the tools
necessary to protect environmental values while upholding the private owner's
property rights. The answer lies at the very heart of property law-the fundamental
truth that property serves both public and private values.88
B. The Dual Role of Property
What had been lost in the judicial fervor of wilderness development in the
nineteenth century was the notion that property serves essentially dual roles, a
private role and a public role. Property's private role has been overshadowed and
limited by its public role. The dual role of property was largely overlooked because
of the sheer abundance of land and a lack of understanding or appreciation for
ecological values. However, with the closing of the American frontier in 1890, and
more recently with current issues of overpopulation, pollution, environmental
degradation, species decline or extinction, and urban sprawl, the time is ripe for a
resurgence-a renaissance-in the recognition of the dual role of property in order
to define human relationships with property. The following paragraphs provide a
basic exploration of the public and private dimensions of property, and conclude that
property has always possessed both public and private attributes.
The right to use and enjoy one's property is a fundamental right protected by
state constitutions and the United States Constitution.89 However, the United States
Constitution does not create property rights.9° Rather, property rights are created and
defined by existing rules, like common law or state law.9' "Property" can take
various forms,92 but when we talk about "property" in a legal sense, we allude to the
bundle of rights enjoyed by the property owner.
93
Within the scope of constitutionally protected property rights are "the rights to
acquire, hold, enjoy, possess, manage, insure, defend and protect, and improve
property, and the right to devote property to any legitimate use. 94 Although there
88. See Sax, supra note 3, at 1453 (espousing the proposition "that property can serve two masters: the
community and the individual").
89. Buskey v. Town of Hanover, 577 A.2d 406, 409 (N.H. 1990).
90. Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).
91. Id.
92. See North Ga. Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601, 608 (1975) (holding that a bank account
is property for due process clauses of the 14th Amendment).
93. See Buskey, 577 A.2d at 409 (acknowledging these rights as the rights "to possess, use, enjoy and dispose
of [property]").
94. 16B AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 587 (1998).
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is no constitutional limit on the amount of property one can own,95 the rights of a
property owner to do as he wishes with his property are not absolute.96 A property
owner may not use her property in ways that endanger or threaten the general
public's health and safety97 or use property in violation of criminal laws.98 Such
limitations on private property are expressed in the maxims "sic utere tuo ut
alienum"99 and "salus populi est suprema lex."'t° Hence, the reality of our system
of property is "[w]hile the constitutional guarantees with reference to the enjoyment
of property should remain stable, it is equally true that they are not so rigid that they
should not, within the realm of reasonableness, bend to accommodate the public
welfare, the well-being of the whole people."' 0 '
Although the owner of property holds many sticks of the bundle, courts have
always realized that property is still subject to the three rights of government: (1)
right of taxation, (2) right of eminent domain, and (3) right of police power.
10 2
Eminent domain is one of the powers of a sovereign government to take privately
owned property upon payment of adequate compensation.10 3 The term "police
power"generally refers to the inherent power of the government to act in ways to
promote the public health, morals, safety, and welfare.' °4 When used within the
context of eminent domain situations, "police power" specifically refers to the
power of the government to regulate the use of land or property without the payment
of compensation.'0 5 In this way, an exercise of the state's eminent domain powers
or the police powers subjects private property to a superior public interest.
However, when exercising the above powers, a state may not arbitrarily interfere
with or limit the enjoyment of property.' °6 When the state exercises its power over
95. Hamilton v. Williams, 200 So. 80, 81 (Fla. 1941).
96. See People v. Beach, 147 Cal. App. 3d 612, 622 (1983) (holding fundamental constitutional rights are
not absolute and may be reasonably restricted in the public interest).
97. See Erb v. Md. Dep't of Env't, 676 A.2d 1017, 1027-28 (holding that the plaintiff was not entitled to
compensation for the denial of his permit to put in a septic tank on his property because the sewage regulatory
scheme regulated against creation of nuisances and the sewage system that plaintiff proposed posed a serious threat
to public health and pollution of water); see also Allied-General Nuclear Servs. v. United States, 839 F.2d 1572,
1573 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (holding that the plaintiff had no legally protected property right to obtain a permit to operate
a facility to recycle spent nuclear fuel where operation of such a facility endangered public welfare ); Mugler v.
Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 663 (1887) (stating that "[n]o one may rightfully do that which the law-making power, upon
reasonable grounds, declares to be prejudicial to the general welfare").
98. See Taylor v. Trianon Amusement Co., 200 So. 912, 914 (Fla. 1941) (explaining that property, such as
the plaintiffs night club, was operated in violation of criminal laws, and so was properly regulated by the County
Solicitor).
99. "So use your own as not to injure that of another's property." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (7th ed. 1999),
at 1690.
100. "The safety of the people is the supreme law." Id. at 1688.
101. 16B AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 583 (1998).
102. City of Cleveland v. Ruple, 200 N.E. 507, 509 (Ohio 1936).
103. JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 423 (4th ed. 1991).
104. Id.
105. Id. at 423-24.
106. See Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis Ry. v. Walters, 294 U.S. 405,415 (1935) (stating police power
is constitutionally limited; therefore, it cannot be exerted arbitrarily or unreasonably).
2001 / The Nature of Nuisance
an individual's property, either through regulation of the property or through an
outright taking of the property, the state's exercise must be for a public purpose-in
furtherance of the general welfare.' 07 Public benefits commensurate with burdens on
private property justify the subordination of private property rights.10 8
Another restriction on private property rights that has historically been allowed
by courts is the subordination of private land to public welfare through the public
trust doctrine. As discussed in Illinois Central Railroad Company v. Illinois,'°9 the
public trust doctrine "is founded upon the necessity of preserving to the public the
use of navigable waters from private interruption and encroachment." "° Under the
public trust doctrine, all public waters are held in trust by the state for the use and
enjoyment of the public."' The doctrine has undergone an expansion in recent years
and is "flexible enough to meet diverse modem needs .... such as swimming and
similar recreation, aesthetic enjoyment of rivers and lakes, and preservation of flora
and fauna indigenous to public trust lands.""' 2 Therefore, in order to promote broad
public interests, a state can impose restrictions on activities on private property that
have the result of affecting public use of water. 113
The notion that private rights in property yield to the public welfare is an old
concept dating back to the founding of this nation. Although Thomas Jefferson
recognized "that some protection of private property was necessary for true
independence," he was ultimately of the republican persuasion that property had an
overriding egalitarian and utilitarian aspect to it so that "property is held by the
individual in trust for the benefit of society as a whole."' 14 Benjamin Franklin, also
held beliefs similar to those of Jefferson. Franklin believed that private property
107. See Pacific Palisades Ass'n v. City of Huntington Beach, 237 P. 538, 539-40 (Cal. 1925) (stating that
zoning, an exercise by the state of its police power, is only permitted where it is "reasonably necessary and
reasonably related to the health, safety, morals, or general welfare of the community").
108. See Direct Plumbing Supply Co. v. City of Dayton, 38 N.E.2d 70,73 (Ohio 1941) (explaining that there
exists a delicate balance between the rights of individual property owners and the power of the government, and
that each faction modifies and restricts the other, yet never extinguishes the other, so that a proper balance between
property rights and public welfare may be struck); see also Town of Bay Harbor Islands v. Schlapik, 57 So.2d 855,
857 (Fla. 1952) (emphasizing that although the state has the power to regulate private land, the state's police power
does not justify an interference with a property owner's rights when the interference outweighs the benefit to the
public).
109. 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
110. Id. at 436.
111. Larson v. Sando, 508 N.W.2d 782,787 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993); State v. Bleck, 338 N.W.2d 492,497-98
(Wis. 1983).
112. District of Columbia v. Air Fla., Inc., 750 F.2d 1077, 1083 (D.C. Cir. 1984); see National Audubon
Soc'y v. Super. Ct., 189 Cal. Rptr. 346, 360 (1983) (stating that "the public trust... is an affirmation of the duty
of the state to protect the people's common heritage of streams, lakes, marshlands and tidelands").
113. See United States v. Kansas City Life Ins. Co., 339 U.S. 799, 808 (1950) (stating that "[t]he owner's use
of property riparian to a navigable stream long has been limited by the right of the public to use the stream in the
interest of navigation .... Thus there has been ample notice over the years that such property is subject to a
dominant public interest.").
114. Anderson, supra note 36, at 532; see id. (stating that although Jefferson believed that people "certainly
must be able to make productive use of property, the land itself was the 'common stock' of all [and that i]ndividual
rights in property, therefore, must yield at times to the greater needs of society").
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existed solely because of society's agreement to recognize and protect individual
interests in property.'l 5 Consequently, any protection society extends to the property
owner "is given subject always to the condition that the property be used to further
the goals of society as a whole." ' 1 6 Thus, early republican philosophy with respect
to property was that private property rights were recognized and protected, but
always balanced against social needs; the greater good and general welfare of
society was always the paramount concern."17
Although the concept of general welfare is broad118 and incapable of a specific
definition," 9 "[t]he primary social interests of safety, order, and morals; economic
interests; and nonmaterial and political interests" generally fall within its scope. 120
However, these are not the only interests the police power is designed to protect.
121
Protection of natural resources and ecosystems promotes the general welfare, and
as such, the state is fully justified in using its broad police power to further the goals
of environmental protection. 122 From this brief discussion, two indisputable truths
115. id. at 533.
116. Id.; Benjamin Franklin felt that
"The accumulation therefore of Property in such a Society, and its Security to Individuals
in every [Society], must be an Effect of the Protection afforded to it by the joint Strength of
the Society, in the Execution of its Laws. Private Property therefore is a Creature of Society,
and is subject to the Calls of that Society, whenever its Necessities shall require it, even to
its last Farthing; its Contributions therefore to the public Exigencies are not to be considered
as conferring a Benefit on the Publik, entitling the Contributors to the Distinctions of Honour
and Power, but as the Return of an Obligation previously received, or the Payment of a just
Debt."
Id. (quoting B. FRANKLIN, QUERIES AND REMARKS RESPECTING ALTERATIONS IN THE CONSTITUTION OF
PENNSYLVANIA, in 10 THE WRITINGS OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN 54, 59 (A. Smyth ed. 1907)).
117. Anderson, supra note 36, at 533; but see id. at 533-35 (noting that "[a]lthough republicanism was the
prevailing philosophy behind the American revolution," it was the federalist viewpoint-"a general distrust of
legislatures because of their tendency to trample on individual property rights," a desire "that individuals be as free
as possible from government interference," and a philosophy which elevated property rights to a level of paramount
importance, "to be protected to the same extent as other individual rights"-that eventually prevailed when the Bill
of Rights was initially debated by the First Congress); see also Cordes, supra note 27, at 645 (maintaining that the
idea of private property rights limited by public concerns remains "the core principle" of American property law
today).
118. See Hendricks v. Com., 865 S.W.2d 332, 338 (Ky. 1993) (stating that the values the public welfare
doctrine protects "are spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic as well as monetary").
119. See Hart v. City of Beverly Hills, II Cal.2d 343, 346 (1938) (stating that the "'general welfare' has an
infinite range, nearly, if not as completely beyond the contemplation of the human mind as is the universe itself');
see also id. (stating the concept of general welfare "knows no bounds; it is as changeable as the 'vagrant breeze"').
120. State v. Hutchinson Ice Creamery Co., 147 N.W. 195, 199 (Iowa 1914).
121. See Nashville, C & St. L. Ry, 294 U.S. at 494-95 (expressing the idea that the police power is designed
to promote broad interests of public convenience and general welfare, not just public health, safety, and morals).
122. See State v. Walsh, 870 P.2d 974, 978 (Wash. 1994) (holding that a "spotlighting" statute was not an
impermissible infringement on defendant's Second Amendment right to bear arms, but was a reasonable exercise
of police power for the protection of the state's big game); Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S.
440,442 (1960) (holding that an ordinance "designed to free from pollution the very air that people breathe clearly
falls within the exercise of even the most traditional concept of what is compendiously known as the police power");
People v. K. Sakai Co., 56 Cal. App. 3d 531,536 (1 st Dist. 1976) (holding that the protection of endangered species
is a matter of general concern and an interest in the public welfare, and as such, it falls within the ambit of the
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emerge: first, property rights are not absolute, and second, although we regard
property rights as a sacred right, landowners ultimately hold their property subject
to greater public good. Simply put, "[a]ll private property systems have limitations
or constraints on them."' 123 For the American landowner in the twenty-first century,
this means that his legal rights in property are necessarily bounded by the public
interest and general welfare124 as well as the "growing attitude that there exists an
inherent public right in property that transcends the technicalities of title."'
125
C. Why the Courts?
"The law of land ownership is one of the cultural elements that expresses our
sense of place in the natural order of life."'126 Judges, as keepers of the common law
and applicators of statutory law play a central role in shaping public sentiment about
what it means to be a landowner, and more broadly, how we view ourselves in
relation to our environment. The task of twenty-first-century judges will be to
actively set out to remedy the antiwilderness bias cemented in property law by their
nineteenth-century counterparts. 1
27
"The common law is supposed to respond to public opinion and to reflect with
more or less fidelity the moral and ethical sentiments of the people."' 28 As science
progresses and gives us a more complete understanding of the effects of our
activities on the natural world, and as environmental philosophies develop and
mature into tenable, conventional edicts, courts must also stay in step with modem
thought. 29 As traditional nineteenth-century notions of land as ripe for owner
State's police powers); Graham v. Estuary Properties, Inc., 399 So.2d 1374, 1381 (Fla. 1981) (holding that the
"[p]rotection of environmentally sensitive areas and pollution prevention are legitimate concerns with the police
power;" therefore, a regulatory agency finding that proposed development would result in pollution to surrounding
bays promoted the welfare of the public and prevented a public harm); State v. Martin, 152 N.E.2d 898, 901-02
(Ohio App. 1957) (stating that conservation of resources is a duty of the state for the benefit of the state's citizens,
and as such, falls with in the state's police power); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Jones, 147 F. Supp. 122, 126 (Okla.
1955) (stating that "[n]othing is more universally recognized than the right which inheres in the state to conserve,
protect and develop its natural resources for the people's general welfare and prosperity").
123. McGregor, supra note 81, at 413.
124. Humbach, supra note 28, at 348; see Cordes, supra note 27, at 642 (stating "[o]ur nation ... has long
recognized that private property interests are limited by public needs," and this is "a position consistently upheld
by courts").
125. Large, supra note 39, at 1074.
126. Freyfogle, supra note 2, at 109.
127. See Sprankling, supra note 38, at 588 (explaining that nineteenth-century judges "disrupted the balance
of property law with the weight of an antiwilderness thumb" and that it should be the job of twenty-first-century
judges to "rebalance the scale with a preservation counterweight").
128. Goldstein, supra note 2, at 410.
129. See Anderson, supra note 36, at 559 (stating that as we become "more developed, more enlightened, as
new discoveries are made, new truths disclosed, and manners and opinions change with the change of
circumstances, institutions must advance also, and keep pace with the times").
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exploitation "are becoming increasingly irrelevant and even harmful,"'13 courts
should adapt the common law to reflect the need for environmental protection and
stewardship.
In our enlightened environmental age, perpetuating nineteenth-century property
laws which have no regard for ecological values demonstrates how foolishly we are
lost in the past; allowing dead nineteenth-century judges to control twenty-first-
century notions of property is a kin to forcing "a civilized society to remain ever
under the regimen of their barbarous ancestors."' 131 If history teaches us anything,
it is that people living in a certain era have been willing to apply their own
contemporary values to the world around them, rather than letting their lives be
ordered by people and archaic notions of the distant past. 32 In fact, the relevance
and legitimacy of the law and courts in the eyes of the public requires the judiciary
be receptive to liberal environmental arguments, seriously consider the
environmental implications of their decisions, and craft decisions in a way sensitive
to ecological concerns. The judiciary should give popular ideas of conservation,
preservation, and ecology their day in court. 133 The judiciary stands in a reciprocal
relationship with society: by incorporating public sentiment into their decisions, the
public's values are reinforced.'3 4 So it is with land and property law. "The law of
ownership therefore does more than reflect a set of values: it helps instill them, and
carries them on." 35 As the judiciary comes to appreciate principles of ecology,
values the natural environment as an end in itself, and truly harmonizes the dual
functions of property, the American people can only follow suit.
IV. THE JUDICIAL COURSE
A. The Starting Point: An Environmental Ethic
One of the most challenging aspects of this area of law is to define what we
mean by an "environmental ethic." If one hundred people were asked to write down
130. Large, supra note 39, at 1082; see Sprankling, supra note 38, at 584 (stating that although wilderness
exploitation may have been defensible at an earlier point in our history when land was abundant, it is now
"unnecessary and dangerous").
131. Anderson, supra note 36, at 559; see Sprankling, supra note 38, at 569 (stating that even though the
American judiciary pay polite lip service to the environmental, pro-wilderness ideals prominent today, "the judiciary
blindly applies most of the antiwilderness doctrines of the past").
132. Freyfogle, supra note 2, at 124; see Sax, supra note 3, at 1447 (stating it is difficult to identify a point
in history when property law encouraged activity which directly conflicted with a community's social values).
133. See Large, supra note 39, at 1082 (explaining "times have changed and that the law [,] to be relevant
[,J must adjust to the exigencies of our present crisis in land use"); see also Freyfogle, supra note 2, at 120
(explaining that "[clourts cannot keep the common law up to date merely by looking to the past and making logical
deductions"); id. (advocating that the solution is for courts to always "keep one eye on the community and its
evolving norms and expectations, and mix the values they find there with the heritage and language of the law").
134. See supra text accompanying note 51 (explaining that nineteenth-century property law developed based
on the people and their will and that the law reflected a set of shared values).
135. Freyfogle, supra note 2, at 109.
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what they felt would be an appropriate environmental ethic society should live by,
one hundred different responses would likely be given. 36 "An environmental ethic
defies precise definition because it reflects human values that vary among
individuals."' 37 Professor Robert Goldstein offers the following definition:
It is an understanding that in an ecosystem every action taken has
consequences; those consequences may be adjudged as positive or negative
values based on the needs of society; and that persons must act as stewards
of their domain, whether that domain be their "owned" real property or
some lesser interest, to prevent actions that cause negative consequences. '38
Perhaps the simplest, most artful expression of an appropriate standard for an
environmental ethic comes from Aldo Leopold in his famous book A Sand County
Almanac: "A thing is right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability, and
beauty of the biotic community. It is wrong when it tends otherwise."' 3 9
The above-discussed formulations for a land ethic are good places to start, and
provide skeletal guidance as to what our goals and values should be in the area of
environmental protection. But perhaps it is not necessary to reduce our
environmental ethic to a black letter maxim. It may not even be wise to do so given
that the environment is in a constant state of flux,"4° and our notions of what
constitutes a healthy environment change through time. ' 4' Although its changes are,
most of the time to us, imperceptibly slow, our environment is constantly changing
and evolving. Ecosystems change and evolve overtime, sometimes unpredictably,
42
and modem ecology recognizes the fact "that ecosystems are complex, dynamic, and
inherently unstable." 43 Similarly, our attitudes and understanding of the
136. See Goldstein, supra note 2, at 388 (explaining that "[d]efining environmental ethics is difficult because
it is a value, and is therefore implicitly subjective").
137. Tucker, supra note 3, at 300.
138. Goldstein, supra note 2, at 391.
139. LEOPOLD, supra note 10, at 224-25.
140. See Eric T. Freyfogle, A Sand County Almanac at 50: Leopold in the New Century, 30 ENVTL. L. REP.
10058 (2000) (stating "[n]ature, ecologists tell us, is in a state of constant flux. It does not reach a climax state of
existence and then remain there; it reaches a point of pause, or disturbance, only to continue along an evolutionary
path that, to human observers, seems aimless.").
141. See Goldstein, supra note 2, at 402.
"A new ecological paradigm has emerged that recognizes ecological systems to be open,
regulated by events arising outside of their boundaries, lacking or prevented from attaining
a stable point of equilibrium, affected by natural disturbance, and incorporating humans and
their effects. A new metaphor of the flux of nature symbolizes the new, or nonequilibrium,
paradigm effectively."
Id. (quoting S.T.A. Pickett & Richard S. Ostfield, The Shifting Paradigm In Ecology, in A NEW CENTURY FOR
NATURAL RESOURCES MANAGEMENT 275 (Richard L. Knight & Sarah F Bates eds., 1995)).
142. Keiter, supra note 14, at 295.
143. Id. at 302; see also Freyfogle, supra note 2, at 110-11 (explaining how relying on ecology to provide
a complete picture of how to regulate land is perhaps asking more than the science can provide since the "natural
order, it turns out, is a moving target, constantly evolving under pressures too numerous to inventory, much less
McGeorge Law Review / Vol. 33
environment also undergo a process of change and maturation generation after
generation. Therefore, a workable environmental ethic will be sufficiently flexible
to adapt to and protect the specific environmental circumstances of a locality as well
as the needs and values of the people living there. At its most basic level, the science
of ecology will provide the theoretical underpinnings necessary to entrench
environmental ethics into real property law. 44Specifically, courts may now look to
the science of ecology to assess harmful or unreasonable use of property in a
nuisance context.1
45
The ground work for infusing the common law with an environmental ethic has
already been laid down for us: elementary concepts of property law tell us that
property serves both public and private values, and that land's private aspects are
limited by public needs. 146 These are old concepts within our law. 147 However they
are also concepts that have been largely forgotten. It is time for courts to involve
themselves in the "property renaissance" and give new life to these old concepts of
landownership. By the term "property renaissance,' I mean for the courts to give a
rebirth to the dual roles of property and actively advocate the public good factor. I
mean for courts to actively balance private rights of landownership against the
greater public good of a clean environment, in contests between those who want to
use land and those who want to protect land. When courts give serious consideration
to the environmental consequences of landowner actions as they affect or harm the
natural environment, and either enjoin harmful activity, or say the activity is not
encompassed in the landowner's bundle of sticks, courts are able to turn the tide on
land exploitation, curb environmental degradation, and shape popular conceptions
about what it means to be a landowner in the twenty-first century. When landowners
realize they do not have the unrestricted right to develop land, but rather hold land
in trust for the community, courts will have started to replace the nineteenth-century
notion of man-as-conqueror over his property with the twenty-first-century ideal of
landowner-as-steward. 148
monitor or predict"); id. at 11l (stating further "that any populous species affects its surroundings-whether
elephants, bison, or humans-which means that some level of human-caused disruption might well be 'natural"').
144. Goldstein, supra note 2, at 402.
145. See id. at 403 (stating "[i]n the 'prohibition of harmful use,' the ecological systems must be considered,
and this could affect otherwise legal conduct on the property").
146. See supra Part UI.B (describing the dual nature of property rights).
147. See supra notes 114-17 and accompanying text (explaining that the concept that private values in land
are tempered by public welfare goes back to the founding days of this country).
148. See LEOPOLD, supra note 10, at 223 (noting the nature of these diametrically opposed points of view:
"man the conqueror versus man the biotic citizen; . . . land as slave and servant versus land the collective
organism").
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B. A Broadened Concept of Nuisance: A Tool to Develop an Environmental
Ethic and Protect Environmental Values
One major way through which courts may advance an environmental ethic, is
through a "broader vision"' 149 of property rights, gained by examining the law of
nuisance. By expanding the notion of what it means to unreasonably use one's
property, courts can enjoin destructive, harmful, or exploitative land practices as
nuisances, thus protecting environmental values for the good of the community as
a whole.
Nuisance is classically defined as "an activity resulting in an unreasonable
interference with the use and enjoyment of another's property." "° Justice Sutherland
colloquially defined nuisance as "merely a right thing in the wrong place, like a pig
in the parlor instead of the barnyard."''
Nuisance theory is a vehicle through which courts can give vitality to the dual
roles of property and protect environmental values, while retaining sufficient
flexibility to tailor decisions to specific factual circumstances as well as societal and
environmental needs. "The term 'nuisance' is incapable of an exhaustive definition
which will fit all cases as it is very comprehensive and it includes everything that
endangers life or health, gives offense to the senses, violates the laws of decency,
or obstructs the reasonable and comfortable use of property."' 52 Essentially, a
nuisance is "a condition which represents an unreasonable interference with another
person's use and enjoyment of his property and causes damage."' 153 The
unreasonableness of an action is determined by the resulting injury, not by the
conduct of the person creating the condition. 154
Nuisances are generally classified as either private, public, or some combination
of the two.'55 A private nuisance is an activity that results in an unreasonable
interference with the use and enjoyment of another's property. 156 Odors emanating
149. See Anderson, supra note 36, at 530 (springboarding off Justice Brennan's language in the Nollan
dissent, Anderson argues that "[in this era of ever-increasing demands on ever-dwindling resources, landowners
must not expect to use their property in a manner contrary to the public interest .... a 'broader vision' of property
rights must prevail"); id. (explaining that this "broader vision would recognize that the land ultimately is a public
resource . . .[and that landowners must restrain themselves in] their use of property [so as not to] harm the
paramount interests of society").
150. Robie v. Lillis, 299 A.2d 155, 158 (N.H. 1972).
151. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388 (1926).
152. United States v. County Bd. of Arlington, 487 F. Supp. 137, 143 (E.D. Va., 1979).
153. Graber v. City of Peoria, 753 P.2d 1209, 1211 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1988).
154. Id.; see also Buckeye Union Fire Ins. Co. v. State, 178 N.W.2d 476, 480 (Mich. 1970) (stating that
"[pirimarily, nuisance is a condition" and liability is not predicated on the conduct, but rather on the resulting injury
of the condition).
155. Norton Shores v. Carr, 265 N.W.2d 802, 805 (Mich. Ct. App. 1978).
156. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS § 822 (1977) (explaining that, under the general rule for private
nuisance, a person is subject to liability if their conduct causes an intentional and unreasonable invasion in another's
use and enjoyment of their land. Liability under private nuisance also includes an invasion that is "unintentional
and otherwise actionable under the rules controlling liability for negligent or reckless conduct or for abnormally
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from a sewage lagoon,'57 dust and noise from a cement plant, 158 operation of a cattle
feedlot near a residential development, 59 and flies and odors associated with
housing horses in a residential neighborhood' 6° are all examples of private
nuisances. Those who recover for a private nuisance have "property rights and
privileges" with respect to the land affected by the activity.
16
A public nuisance, on the other hand, is defined by the Restatement (Second)
of Torts as "an unreasonable interference with a right common to the general
public."162 To sustain an action for public nuisance, the obstruction of a public right
must pose "a significant interference with the public health, the public safety, the
public peace, the public comfort or the public convenience."'' 63 The operation of a
hazardous-chemical-waste landfill within a city,'64 "noise pollution" emanating from
a bar and restaurant six-hundred to eight-hundred feet from residential housing,1
65
and the discharge of waste water into a lake166 are examples of public nuisances.
Generally, a city attorney or another public official may bring a public nuisance
action since a private party may not bring a public nuisance action unless he or she
has sustained "special damage, distinct from that common to the public.'
' 67
However, rules governing who may bring an action in public nuisance might be
relaxing. 168
C. The Broadened Nuisance Theory
Today, "some land-use developments place devastating burdens on today's
fragile environment.,'169 The externalities of environmental degradation are felt
throughout the biotic community, and pose significant consequences for the health,
safety, and welfare of people.170 People today increasingly "view development with
dangerous conditions or activities.").
157. Pate v. City of Martin, 614 S.W.2d 46, 48 (Tenn. 1981).
158. Lunda v. Matthews, 613 P.2d 63, 66 (Or. Ct. App. 1980).
159. Spur Indus., Inc. v. Del E. Webb Dev. Co., 494 P.2d 700, 706 (Ariz. 1972).
160. Hobbs v. Smith, 493 P.2d 1352, 1353 (Colo. 1972).
161. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 82 1E (1977).
162. Id. at § 821B (1).
163. Id. at § 821B (2)(a).
164. Village of Wilsonville v. SCA Serv. Inc., 426 N.E.2d 824, 831 (I11. 981).
165. People v. Mason, 124 Cal. App. 3d 348 (1981).
166. United States ex rel. Scott v. United States Steel Corp., 356 F. Supp. 556 (N.D. 111.1973).
167. Holloway v. Bristol-Myers Corp., 327 F Supp. 17, 24 (D.C.D.C. 1971).
168. See Akau v. Olohana Corp., 652 P.2d 1130, 1134 (Haw. 1982) (stating that "a member of the public has
standing to sue to enforce the rights of the public [against a public nuisance] even though his injury is not different
in kind from the public's generally, if he can show that he has suffered an injury in fact, and that the concerns of
a multiplicity of suits are satisfied by any means, including a class action").
169. Raymond R. Coletta, Reciprocity of Advantage and Regulatory Takings: Toward a New Theory of
Takings Jurisprudence, 40 AM. U. L. REv. 297, 357 (1990); see id. (stating the traditionally narrow scope of the
nuisance doctrine may be expanding to restrict "nuisance-like" activities).
170. See Coletta, supra note 169, at 357 (describing these consequences to public health, safety, and welfare
as "substantial" and "immediate").
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suspicion and even hostility."' 171 Contemporary pro-environment sentiment, coupled
with the "reality that much development has significant nuisance-like
consequences," 172 justify an expansion of nuisance principles to protect ecosystems
and environmental values.
Land ownership has always entailed social obligation. 173 Today, "land, and
especially undeveloped land, is a public resource whose use must be guided by
public concerns."' 174 Judicial expansion of nuisance principles allows courts to
protect the health, safety, and welfare of the people, through environmental
protection.
Through a rigorous application of nuisance law, as well as a broad concept of
harm or unreasonableness, courts are in a position to apply a land ethic and vindicate
environmental values for the good of the community. Since "no individual has the
right to use his property so as to create a nuisance or otherwise harm others,"'
' 75
courts may legitimately decree that any nuisance-like activity may be enjoined since
it was not part of the bundle of rights the property owner had in relation to his
property to begin with. 176 This necessarily requires courts to expand current notions
of what constitutes harmful, offensive, or unreasonable consequences of certain
activities to include those activities that place excessive environmental harms on the
environment. An example how broadened nuisance principles can be applied in a
contemporary land use case to prevent environmental harm from residential
development causing ecosystem degradation without running afoul of the takings
clause is in order. The case of Good v. United States177 will provide the backdrop.
In 1973, Lloyd Good purchased forty acres of undeveloped land on Lower
Sugarloaf Key, Florida: thirty-two acres of wetland and eight acres of uplands. 78
Although the sales contract for the land contemplated certain problems with
obtaining permits to dredge and fill the wetland area, 179 Good hired a land planning
and development firm to obtain the necessary permits to turn Sugarloaf Shores, a
171. Humbach, supra note 28, at 341.
172. Coletta, supra note 169, at 357.
173. See Humbach, supra note 28, at 344 (stating "the social obligation of property ... is inherent in the
structure of American law"); id. at 345-48 (explaining property rights exist to serve the public good, and so are
limited by the needs of the general welfare, so that "[w]here the private autonomy of ownership would clash with
the greater public good, that is where the private rights in property come to an end and the social obligation of
property begins"); see also supra notes 40-41, 44-49 and accompanying text (detailing how in the nineteenth
century the social obligation was defined as the duty to develop property).
174. Cordes, supra note 27, at 655.
175. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 506 n.20 (1987).
176. See Anderson, supra note 36, at 541 (noting that "[i]f the only viable economic use of the property is
one inimical to the public welfare, the owner did not have a property right in the first place").
177. 189 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
178. Id. at 1357.
179. See id. (noting the sales contract stated : "The Buyers recognize that certain of the lands covered by this
contract may be below the mean high tide line and that as of today there are certain problems in connection with
the obtaining of State and Federal permission for dredging and filling operations").
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wetland area situated in the Florida Keys, into a residential development. 80 In 1984,
the United States Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) granted Good's permit,
authorizing Good to fill 7.4 acres of marshland and excavate another 5.4 acres of salt
marsh in order to build a 54-lot residential subdivision, complete with a 48-slip
marina.' 8' Also in 1983, Good received state and county permits approving his plans
for development. 182 However, Good would never get to build.
Subsequently, a battle ensued between Good and various state, county, and
federal regulatory agencies for final approval and permits for development. 83 In the
interim, the Lower Keys marsh rabbit, silver rice rat, and mud turtle 8 4 were all
determined to be endangered species with habitat on Good's property.'85 The Corps
eventually denied Good's permits and permit applications, citing the development's
threat to the endangered rabbit and rat.
86
Good subsequently sued the United States, alleging that the Corps' denial of his
permits amounted to an uncompensated taking in violation of the Fifth Amendment
of the United States Constitution. 87 The Court of Federal Claims found no taking
and granted summary judgement in favor of the government.
88
The United States Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court's determination
that no taking had occurred, stating that "In view of the regulatory climate that
existed when Appellant acquired the subject property, Appellant could not have had
a reasonable expectation that he would obtain approval to fill ten acres of wetland
180. id. In the contract with the land planning and development firm, Good conceded that "obtaining said
permits is at best difficult and by no means assured."
181. Id.
182. Id. at 1357.
183. See id. at 1357-58 (detailing how the Florida Department ofCommunity Affairs challenged the issuance
of the county permit, and, that in the time it took Good to clear up this problem, his federal permit issued by the
Corps was almost expired); see also id. at 1357-59 (explaining that more county permit problems faced Good, and
in 1990 Good "[a]pparently dispairing of ever obtaining approval for his 54-lot plan," submitted a scaled-down plan
for development which proposed building only sixteen homes, a canal, and tennis court); id. (stating that although
this new plan "greatly reduced the overall number of houses, it located all of them in the wetlands area f,
consequently] overall wetlands loss ... was only reduced from 10.53 acres to 10.17 acres").
184. See Good, 189 F.3d at 1358 (stating that the mud turtle was a "state-listed" endangered species).
185. See id. at 1359 (stating that the Fish and Wildlife Service issues a biological opinion stating that Good's




188. See id. at 1359-60 (stating that the Court of Federal Claims found that the Corps denial of Good's permit
application did not constitute a "per se" taking under Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council "because the ESA
did not require that the property be left in its natural state and because the government had shown that the property
retained value, either for development or for sale of transferrable development rights" ); see also id. at 1360 (stating
that the Court of Federal Claims held there was no taking under the Penn Central test either, finding Good lacked
the reasonable, investment-backed expectations that he could develop his land since federal and state regulations
"imposed significant restrictions on his ability to develop his property both at the time he purchased it and at the
time he began to develop it").
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in order to develop the land."' 189 The court noted that "public concern about the
environment resulted in numerous laws and regulations affecting land
development," and listed the 1973 Endangered Species Act, the 1975 Corps'
decision to broaden its interpretation of its § 404 authority to regulate wetlands, the
Florida Endangered and Threatened Species Act, and the 1979 Florida Keys
Protection Act which evidenced "further . . . public concern for Florida's
environment."' 190
Arriving at the conclusion that Good suffered no compensable taking, the
United States Court of Appeals chose to focus on the reasonable, investment-backed
expectations prong of the Penn Central test. A "regulatory climate," the court
concluded was enough to put the landowner on notice that he might not be able to
develop his land to the full extent he desires.' 9'
Since Good had no reasonable, investment-backed expectations that he could
develop his property due to the "pervasive regulatory climate," the court effectively
found a way to work within the existing common law framework in order to not find
a taking. Although the court never explicitly stated that its goal was environmental
preservation, this was the end result. However, scholars have put forth alternative
theories about how courts might go about curbing development or other
environmentally destructive uses of property, without finding that just compensation
must be paid for a "taking," thus protecting the environment and preserving
environmental values.
For instance, Professor Jerry L. Anderson argues that landowners' rights
regarding development of land "must be tempered by a public interest condition.", 92
According to Professor Anderson, not only are property owners subject to the
maxim that one may not use their land to injure other, but hold their land "subject
to an implied condition that [their land] be used in the public interest."' 193 Therefore,
any landowner activity that is contrary to the public interest is not a legitimate use
of land and will not be recognized as a compensable taking.'
94
189. Id. at 1361-62; see id. at 1362 (stating that "Appellant thus had both constructive and actual knowledge
that either state or federal regulations could ultimately prevent him from building on the property" and that "rising
environmental awareness translated into ever-tightening land use regulations" and "[slurely Appellant was not
oblivious to this trend").
190. Id. at 1362.
191. Id. at 1361-62. An interesting question arises as to what exactly is a "regulatory climate" and when it
puts someone on notice. See Humbach, supra note 28, at 367-68 (stating that since "development is an increasingly
regulated field, and every competent developer knows that the trend is toward even greater refinement of land use
controls" an investor who buys land with the intent to develop it in the future, assuming the same environmental
and land use laws will be in place 10 years down the road, only to then be stymied by current laws which forbid
development "simply [can] not [have] a reasonable expectation, 'investment-backed' or otherwise"). See also
Anderson, supra note 36, at 558 (explaining that "the current environmental and land use situation has created a
necessity that should temper the expectations of every landowner about the use of property").
192. Anderson, supra note 36, at 562.
193. Id. at 551.
194. Id. at 558.
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Applying Anderson's argument to the Good situation, courts would insist that
Good's activity on his land be consistent with the public interest. From there, courts
may find that destroying over ten acres of wetland habitat in order to build sixteen
houses is contrary to the public interest in preserving wetland ecosystems.1 95
Therefore Good suffers no taking since he never had the right to engage in such
destructive behavior in the first place.
Reciprocity of advantage is another theory through which environmental values
can be protected without triggering the takings clause. 196 As Professor Raymond R.
195. The term "wetland" is given to those transitional areas between land and water bodies where water
periodically floods the land or saturates the soil, as well as those areas which remain covered with water year round.
Wetlands are extremely common throughout the United States and can be found in almost every county of
every state in the nation. These ecosystems are diverse in character, but can be divided into two broad categories:
Non-Tidal Wetlands and Tidal Wetlands. Non-Tidal Wetlands, which account for most of the wetland area of the
United States, are ubiquitous throughout the interior of the country. Examples of Non-Tidal Wetlands include
Alaskan and Appalachian peat bogs, southern deepwater swamps, inland freshwater marshes, and Western riparian
wetlands.
Tidal wetlands are found along the nation's coastlines and those inland bodies of water that are nonetheless
influenced by tidal effects. Tidal wetlands include areas known as Tidal Salt Marshes, Mangrove Swamps, and Tidal
Freshwater Marshes.
Wetlands are as beneficial as they are abundant, and serve both environmental as well as socio-economic
functions and values. These ecosystems enhance environmental quality in a number of ways. First, wetlands ensure
shoreline and streambank stabilization as well as control erosion. Shorelines and streambanks absorb the energy
of waves and water currents, and wetland vegetation binds soil along waterways, slowing downstream sediment
movement. Second, wetlands act as natural water purifiers, improving water quality. Sediments are filtered through
these areas and pollutants are absorbed in these ecosystems enhancing the quality of surface and groundwater. Third,
in times of rain and flood, wetlands store huge amounts of water, thus reducing the risk of flood damage. The slow
release of this stored water helps prevent rivers from drying up during times of drought. Finally, these ecosystems
provide vital habitat for a variety of species, many of which are specially adapted to live in these wet environments.
Wetlands provide breeding grounds for over 50 percent of northern American waterfowl, and about 35 percent of
all threatened or endangered species in the United States depend on wetlands for their survival.
Socio-economic functions of wetlands are also varied and diverse. Wetland areas are rich ecological, cultural,
and historic resources providing a myriad of educational as well as recreational opportunities. Hunting, fishing,
boating, hiking, sightseeing, animal watching, and photography are just some activities that await anyone wishing
to visit a thriving wetland ecosystem.
Many times the socio-economic and environmental benefits of wetland areas are so intertwined as to become
one in the same. That is to say, the quality of the socio-economic benefits depend on, and are directly proportional
to the health and proper functioning of an intact wetland ecosystem-the healthier the ecosystem, the more it
benefits humans. For instance, as discussed above, wetlands clean and filter water. The Florida Everglades help
recharge the Biscayne Aquifer-the sole source of drinking water for the Miami metro area. Also, as stated above,
vast expanses of wetlands can store huge amounts of water. During heavy rains and snow melt, wetlands can reduce
flooding, lessening property damage (and loss of life) in developed areas. Finally, between 60 to 90 percent of U.S.
commercial fisheries depend on wetlands to ensure a continuous harvest year after year. Both freshwater and marine
life rely on wetland ecosystems to provide food, cover, spawning and nursery grounds.
Obviously, today we are more aware than ever about the benefits of these once-despised environments, and
realize that destruction of wetland areas will yield negative consequences for all. As a result, because environmental
protection is in our best interest, it would be wise to preserve wetlands, and all ecosystems, through a court-
recognized duty of stewardship. U.S. DEPT. OF THE INTERIOR NATIONAL PARK SERVICE PAMPHLET, WETLANDS IN
THE NATIONAL PARKS, 1998 (copy on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
196. See Coletta, supra note 169, at 303 (stating that "'average reciprocity of advantage' could be utilized
to provide broad justification for land use regulation and thereby substantially limit the accessibility of inverse
condemnation actions").
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Coletta explains, the crux of reciprocity of advantage is the "presumption that
mutual restrictions on property use can enhance the total welfare of the affected
landowners."' 97 Therefore, state legislatures can enact (strict) land use and zoning
regulations, and yet courts applying the reciprocity of advantage theory will find no
compensable regulatory taking since individual landowners subject to restrictive
land use regulations should not be viewed as "burdened individual[s]," but as
realizing benefits accruing to them as members of the community at large.' 98 In this
way, the scope of compensable takings claims are narrowed and society benefits
from increased environmental protection. 199
Although the Good case is not about zoning, but about permit denial, Professor
Coletta's basic reasoning is still applicable here. In not finding a taking, courts may
note that any similarly situated landowner with similar development plans can
expect the same result. In this way courts are able to preserve fragile ecosystems,
allowing the benefits of intact wetland areas to accrue to the community at large.
Good, as a landowner is not a "burdened individual" but will be able to enjoy not
only his property in a somewhat natural state, but will be able to benefit from
surrounding properties that must not be developed in such a drastic and destructive
fashion.
Professor Robert J. Goldstein advocates yet another approach by which courts
can protect environmental values while avoiding the takings issue. He argues that
courts recognize "green wood" in the bundle of sticks that make up a property
owner's rights. Green wood "is an effort to remove some of the abstraction from the
theory [of] real property,"2°° and infuse modem property law with principles of
ecology and an environmental ethic.2 ' Specifically, the theory of green wood is that
a property owner is under an ethical obligation to refrain from engaging in activity
that would result in an "ecological nuisance. 2 2 To further this end, Goldstein
premises his argument, quite correctly, on three principles: (1) that "[n]o piece of
land can be considered to be without value or substantially without value," (2)
environmental regulation is a valid exercise of police power designed to prevent
public nuisance, and (3) "[m]andating the maintenance of [the environment] does
not alter the value of the real property as to invoke a taking. '20 3 Green wood is not
meant to stifle development, 2°4 rather it is a balance of private property rights and
197. Id. at 302.
198. Id. at 303; see Cordes, supra note 27, at 648-49 (discussing the related concepts of "givings" (the
concept that "much of the value of privately owned land is in fact created by public activity") as well as specific
and general reciprocity).
199. Coletta, supra note 169, at 365-66.
200. Goldstein, supra note 2, at 374.
201. See id. at 403 (explaining green wood is "the live stick firmly rooted in the earth from which it sprouted,
and closely tied to the environment which nurtured its progression from seedling to maturity").
202. Id. at410-11.
203. ld. at 415-16.
204. Id. at 421; see id. at 411 (stating green wood will "mandate environmental protection [but] will not effect
a moratorium on development").
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environmental ethics, 205 ensuring that property rights will not be determined solely
by economic considerations, but will incorporate the "important societal interest of
preserving the environment.,
20 6
Under Goldstein's green wood theory, courts could prevent Good from
destroying over ten acres of sensitive and valuable wetland area because such
activity would constitute an ecological nuisance. If Good were allowed to proceed
with his development plans, ten acres of wetland would be out of commission and
society would loose the benefits accruing from this land, possibly forever.0 7 In
addition to his legal obligation to not create a nuisance, Good also has an ethical
obligation to refrain from such destructive behavior. Even with whatever minimal
development Good may be allowed, his land could never become valueless or
substantially without value so as to invoke a taking. Furthermore, the courts would
recognize that the state permitting processes are environmental regulations
conducted as a valid exercise of the state's police power to avoid the public nuisance
of wetland degradation.
D. The Property Renaissance: Broadened Nuisance Theory and the Dual Role
of Property in Action
Our concepts of the environment in terms of meeting societal needs has changed
significantly over time in light of society's new knowledge and understanding of
natural processes. 208 Ecology "has brought to an end the era of mythical, abstract
Blackacre, ''2°9 and has left us with an "increasing awareness of the need for human
stewardship of the environment., 210 Courts can promote the stewardship paradigm
through rigorous application of broadened nuisance principles and through a rebirth
of traditional notions of the dual role of property. Specifically, when determining
harm 211 within the nuisance context, courts must be guided by principles of ecology
with a sensitivity and emphasis upon the externalities foisted upon the biological
and social community in which the landowner's activity has its effects. These
externalities would be the basis for how courts could judge the reasonableness of an
activity or the harm resulting from the ecological nuisance. Aware of society's
current emphasis on the environment, courts should explicitly remind landowners
of the dual nature of property-that landowners hold their property subject to the
205. Id. at 422.
206. Id.
207. In the grand scheme of things, the destruction often acres seems trivial, but if every wetland owner had
similar objectives, the aggragation of effects could signal death for that particular ecosystem.
208. Cordes, supra note 27, at 643.
209. Freyfogle, supra note 2, at 125.
210. Goldstein, supra note 2, at 347.
211. See id. at 382 (stating "[h]armful use connotes harm of others off the property").
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greater public good 212-thereby implicitly directing landowner efforts and
expectations toward property away from destructive, negative externality-causing
behavior, and in the direction of stewardship.
Today, with our "growing knowledge" of ecology and the environment, we
should create "a new set of values: a maturing, rediscovered sense that humans are
part of a larger natural order and, as such, ought to abide by moral rules that reflect
and incorporate that vital membership., 23 Broadened concepts of nuisance, coupled
with an application of the dual roles of property, provide such a framework through
which courts can craft this new set of values to harmonize human activity within the
natural world and give emphasis to the "social obligation of property that is inherent
in the structure of American law., 214 Take, for instance, the landowner in Good's
situation. Had he known courts would rigorously apply broadened nuisance
principles, thus finding destruction of wetlands results in unreasonable harm, 2 5 and
that courts would stress Good's obligation to hold wetland area to promote the
general welfare, Good might not have even bought this land in the first place. If
Good knew courts were going to protect environmental values, and prohibit gross
and destructive development, and still chose to buy, Good would know courts would
allow him to develop only to the extent that development is consistent with his duty
of stewardship. 1 6
Courts have already established a duty of stewardship of sorts with the
recognition that "[a]ll property in this country is held under the implied obligation
that the owner's use of it shall not be injurious to the community., 217 Courts have
also decreed that a landowner "has no absolute and unlimited right to change the
essential natural character of his land so as to use it for a purpose for which it was
unsuited in its natural state and which injures the rights of others., 21 8 A recognition
of the dual role of property, as well as broadened nuisance principles, guides courts
as to how land can be used and developed. The extent of development allowed under
a broadened nuisance theory and the dual role of property concept would take into
account such factors as fragility of the ecosystem, value to society of the ecosystem
212. See Humbach, supra note 28, at 347-48 (explaining that "where the private autonomy of ownership
would clash with the greater public good, that is where the private rights in property come to an end and the social
obligation of property begins").
213. Freyfogle, supra note 2, at 104.
214. Humbach, supra note 28, at 344.
215. Unreasonable harm here was determined by approximating negative externalities arising from
development. See Goldstein, supra note 2, at 381 (explaining that filling wetland area affects the property rights
of all adjacent individual owners because their land will be affected in some way).
216. This may mean constructing a handful of homes using construction techniques that would minimize
ecosystem harm. It may mean Good would be allowed to build one home on this land. Or it could mean that the only
development that would be consistent with Good's duty of stewardship and obligation not to create an ecological
nuisance would be the construction of a five foot fishing pier and boat dock. There is also the possibility that courts
could find a particular ecosystem so sensitive, that any development would yield unreasonable harm consisting an
ecological nuisance, in which case all development would be forbidden.
217. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 665 (1887).
218. Just v. Marinette County, 201 N.W.2d 761, 768 (Wis. 1972).
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left in a natural state because of services provided by that ecosystem to biotic and
abiotic life, environmentalist or preservationist sentiment of the local and national
community as it relates to proposed land use or development, the harm inflicted to
the particular ecosystem because of development, the externalities associated with
development, and the extent to which development is necessary to sustain basic
human needs.
E. The Interconnectedness of Land
Although this broadened nuisance theory may seem like a radical change in
modern property law, it is more than a novel land-use concept-it is an ecological
necessity. Today, we are faced with the reality that we are reaching the land's
carrying capacity 19 and are experiencing the harm associated with pushing our lands
to the limit.20 Furthermore, an ecological perspective on nuisance law is needed
since the effects of environmental harm are felt throughout the biotic community.
221
Environmental nuisance pays no heed to socially constructed boundary lines.
Ecology has taught us that land and its natural processes are interconnected, and that
viewing land through the ecological lens decrease the significance of man-made
boundary lines:
222
We now realize that whatever the state of its title, one parcel of land is
inextricably intertwined with other parcels, and that causes and effects flow
across artificially imposed divisions in the land without regard for legal
boundaries. The land simply cannot be neatly divided into mine and
yours.223
Due to the transboundary effects of environmental degradation,
nuisance-particularly public nuisance-is a theory uniquely tailored to be an
affective tool in the area of land management because it enables an individual to
assert a claim against a defendant who threatens unreasonable harm to a resource
common to all-the environment. Nuisance recognizes that "the effects of property
219. See Freyfogle, supra note 2, at 79 (explaining that carrying capacity is "the reality that any type of
human land use, however benign the use and however appropriate the location, can prove harmful when too many
acres are devoted to it"); see also id. (asserting that there comes a point at which society must draw a line delineating
when and where the carrying capacity has been reached and where we can disturb the land no further).
220. See id. at 127 (explaining that carrying capacity harm is harm that comes to land "caused, not because
a given land use is bad per se, but because it is bad and harmful when too many acres are devoted to it and the land's
limits are reached").
221. See Large, supra note 39, at 1047 (stating that as problems with land increase, we increase our
understanding of the "interrelatedness of all land").
222. Sax, supra note 3, at 1445.
223. Large, supra note 39, at 1045.
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use inevitably extend beyond land boundaries and often conflict with neighboring
uses, necessitating a reasonable accommodation of interests. 2 4
The interconnectedness of land is also evident beyond an ecological level.
Besides being linked ecologically, parcels of land are also linked
philosophically-people today see the American landscape "more and more as the
shared heritage of all. '225 A collective concern over the environment is further




We once lived in an age of ecological indifference, if not ecological ignorance.
"Man-as-conqueror" of land has taken its toll on the natural environment. Today
there is an effort to reorient our emphasis from wilderness exploiter to ecosystem
steward. "[S]ocietal values do evolve, and the laws must follow. In the case of real
property, environmental values have taken hold, and must become the basis for
changes in the law.,
227
Today, law makers and lawyers are speaking in ecosystem terms.22 ' Are the
courts listening?
224. Cordes, supra note 27, at 640; see id. at 645 (reiterating that the "core justification" for public control
of land in the first instance "is the realization that land uses often conflict with each other, and if left uncontrolled,
a landowner's activity will often impose significant costs on neighbors").
225. Humbach, supra note 28, at 369; see id. (noting that the public also possesses shared concerns over
preservation of ever shrinking open spaces and has concerns about the character of land in general); Anderson,
supra note 36, at 544-45 (arguing that because we live "[i]n an age of ever-dwindling resources and ever-increasing
demands on those resources, the principle that the earth is the 'common stock' of man must assume a greater role
in takings analysis").
226. See Coletta, supra note 169, at 362 (recognizing that land ownership is "heavily laden with social
obligations," and that society may be moving toward a more socially responsible property scheme because of the
increased utilization by courts of police power to uphold zoning regulations).
227. Goldstein, supra note 2, at 360; see id. at 430 ("Current conditions warrant the acceptance of a definition
of real property that takes the environment into full account.").
228. Keiter, supra note 14, at 294-95.
